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I develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents
can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model,
the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The frame-
work is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. If the
agents can contract on provision levels, but not on investments, they invest subopti-
mally little, particularly if the contract is short-term or close to its expiration date.
To encourage su¢ cient investments, the optimal and equilibrium contract is more
ambitious if it is short-lasting, and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration
date. If renegotiation is possible, such a contract implements the ￿rst best. The
results have important implications for how to design a climate treaty.
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This paper develops a dynamic model of private provision of public goods. The agents
can also invest in cost-reducing technologies, leading to n + 1 stocks, but the analysis
is nevertheless tractable. I derive and characterize a unique Markov perfect equilibrium
for the noncooperative game as well as for situations where the agents can negotiate and
contract on contribution levels. In particular, the optimal and equilibrium contract is
described.
The model is general and could ￿t various contexts. The leading example is climate
change, and the results have clear implications for how to design an e¢ cient treaty. Con-
sistent with the model￿ s assumptions, a country can reduce its emission in multiple ways:
a short-term solution is to simply consume less fossil fuel today, while a more long-term
solution might be to invest in new technologies, such as renewable energy sources or
abatement technology. The Kyoto Protocol is a bargaining outcome limiting the coun-
tries￿emission levels, but it does not specify the extent to which countries should invest
or simply reduce its short-term consumption. This distinction would, in any case, be
di¢ cult to verify. At the same time, the Protocol is relatively short-lasting, since the
commitments expire in 2012. This may re￿ ect the di¢ culties or costs of committing to
the distant future.
All these aspects are in line with the model. To ￿x ideas, I will refer to the players
as "countries" and their contributions as "emissions." The public good, or rather its
negative: the public bad, can be interpreted as greenhouse gases. The technology provides
a private substitute for polluting, and can be interpreted as renewable energy or abatement
technology. The model abstracts from heterogeneities across and within countries as well
as the di¢ culties of motivating participation and compliance. I thus describe an idealized
benchmark case that isolates the interactions between negotiated quotas and incentives
to invest in technologies.
The real investment cost function may be convex or concave (if there are increasing
returns to scale). By assuming it is linear, I prove that the continuation value must be
linear in all the n+1 stocks. Thus, the payo⁄-relevant history is represented by a weighted
2sum of the stocks. Only one MPE satis￿es these conditions, so the MPE is unique. This
MPE is stationary and coincides with the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if time
were ￿nite but approached in￿nity. These attractive equilibrium properties hold for every
scenario studied in the paper.
First, the noncooperative outcome is characterized. Although the technology is private
and investments are sel￿sh, each country￿ s technology stock is, in e⁄ect, a public good,
since its role is to substitute for the country￿ s contribution to the public bad. If one
country happens to pollute a lot, the other countries are, in the future, induced to pollute
less since the problem is then more severe. They will also invest more in technology to
be able to a⁄ord the necessary cuts in emissions. On the other hand, if a country invests
a lot in abatement technology, it can be expected to pollute less in the future. This
induces the other countries to increase their emissions and reduce their own investments.
Anticipating these e⁄ects, each country pollutes more and invests less than it would in an
otherwise similar static model. This dynamic common-pool problem is thus particularly
severe.
Since the MPE is unique, agreements enforced by trigger strategies are not feasible.
Instead, I derive the equilibrium outcome assuming the agents can contract on emission
levels. For climate agreements, for example, countries may be able to commit at least to
the near future, since domestic stakeholders can hold the government accountable if it has
rati￿ed an international agreement. Instead of taking a stand on the countries￿ability to
commit, I derive the equilibrium contract as a function of this ability.
To begin, suppose the time horizon of a contract is represented by the length of "a
period" in the model. If there were only one period, contracting on emission levels would
be ￿rst best since investments in technology are sel￿sh (one country￿ s investment has no
spillover e⁄ect on the other countries￿technologies). With multiple periods, however, the
technology stock that survives to the next period is, in e⁄ect, a public good. The reason
for this is that a hold-up problem arises when the countries negotiate emission levels:
if one country has better technology and can cut its emissions fairly cheaply, then its
opponents may ask it to bear the lion￿ s share of the burden when collective emissions are
reduced. Anticipating this, countries invest less when negotiations are coming up. Thus,
3the countries underinvest, particularly if the period is short while the technology is long-
lasting. With smaller investments, it is ex post optimal to allow for larger emission levels.
On the other hand, since the countries are underinvesting, they would like to encourage
more investments and they can do this by negotiating a contract that is tough and allows
few emissions. Thus, the best (and equilibrium) contract is tougher and stipulates lower
emissions compared to the optimum ex post, particularly if the length of the contract is
relatively short and the technology long-lasting. Surprisingly, the equilibrium pollution
level is identical to the level that would have been ￿rst best if investments had been
e¢ cient.
If the countries can negotiate and contract on the emission level for several periods,
then investments are suboptimally low only at the end of the agreement, since the technol-
ogy that then remains is, in e⁄ect, a public good, thanks to the hold-up problem. Thus,
investments decline toward the end of the contract. Anticipating this, and to further
motivate investments, the optimal and equilibrium contract becomes tougher to satisfy
over time.
However, these contracts are not renegotiation-proof. Once the investments are sunk,
countries have an incentive to negotiate ex-post optimal emission levels rather than stick-
ing to an overambitious contract. When renegotiation is possible and cannot be prevented,
an investing country understands that it does not, in the end, have to comply with overam-
bitious contracts. Nevertheless, with renegotiation, all investments and emissions are ￿rst
best. Intuitively, emission levels are renegotiated to ex-post optimal levels. Countries with
poor technology ￿nd it particularly costly to comply with an initial ambitious agreement
and will be quite desperate to renegotiate it. This gives them a weak bargaining position
and a bad outcome. To avoid this fate, countries invest more in technology, particularly if
the initial contract is very ambitious. Taking advantage of this e⁄ect, the contract should
be tougher if it has a relatively short duration, or if it is close to its expiration date, just
as in the case without renegotiation.
Observationally, the outcome of these (re)negotiations is equivalent to a time-inconsistency
problem. Repeatedly, the countries make very ambitious promises for future actions. But
when the future arrives, they relax these promises while, at the same time, they make
4ambitious promises for the future - once again. However, rather than being evidence of a
time-inconsistency problem, this behavior implements the ￿rst best in this model.
The results have important implications for the optimal design of a climate treaty.
First, even if countries can commit to emission quantities and investments are sel￿sh,
countries tend to invest too little, particularly for short-term agreements. Second, the
optimal treaty should be tougher if it is short-term and, third, it should be tougher close
to its expiration date. Finally, e¢ ciency is achieved by long-term agreements that are
renegotiated over time. In other words, when negotiating a new treaty, it is better if the
default outcome is some existing treaty rather than the noncooperative outcome. This
suggest that climate negotiators have something to learn from international trade policy
negotiators, since trade agreements are typically long-lasting, although they can expand
or be renegotiated over time.
While this paper is more general and emphasizes the bene￿ts of renegotiation, my
companion paper, Harstad (2010), assumes quadratic utilities and goes further when
studying short-term agreements, whether such an agreement is valuable, and what the
optimal agreement length should be. Furthermore, that paper shows that domestic holdup
problems interact with the international one, and that the optimal climate treaty design
depends on existing R&D policies, and vice versa.
The next section clari￿es the paper￿ s contribution to the literature on dynamic games
and incomplete contracts. The model is presented in Section 3. When solving the model
in Section 4, I gradually increase the possibilities for negotiations and contracts by ana-
lyzing (i) no cooperation, (ii) one-period contracts, (iii) multi-period contracts, and (iii)
contracts permitting renegotiation. Section 5 allows for technological spillovers and Sec-
tion 6 discusses other extensions and generalizations. Section 7 concludes, while the
appendix contains all proofs.
2. Contributions to the Literature
By developing a dynamic (di⁄erence) game permitting incomplete contracts, the paper
contributes to the literature on both of these ￿elds.
52.1. Dynamic Games
The private provision of public goods is often studied in di⁄erential games (or a di⁄erence
game, if time is discrete) where each player￿ s action in￿ uences the future stock or state
parameter.1 Given the emphasis on stocks, the natural equilibrium concept is Markov
perfect equilibrium.2 As in this paper, the typical conclusion is that public goods (bads)
are underprovided (overprovided).3
Di⁄erential games are, however, often di¢ cult to analyze. This has several implica-
tions. First, many authors restrict attention to linear-quadratic functional forms.4 Sec-
ond, while some papers arbitrarily select the linear MPE (e.g., Fershtman and Nitzan,
1991), typically there are multiple equilibria (Wirl, 1996; Tutsui and Mino, 1990). Conse-
quently, many scholars, like Dutta and Radner (2009), manage to construct more e¢ cient
nonlinear MPEs.5 Third, few bother complicating their model further by adding invest-
ments in technologies. One exception is Dutta and Radner (2004), who do explicitly add
investments in technology. But since the cost of pollution (as well as the cost of R&D) is
assumed to be linear, the equilibrium is ￿bang-bang￿where countries invest either zero
or maximally in the ￿rst period, and never thereafter.
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is the development of a tractable model that can
be used to analyze investments as well as emissions. By assuming that technology has a
linear cost and an additive impact, I ￿nd that the continuation values must be linear in
all the n + 1 stocks, permitting only a single MPE. This trick sharpens the predictions
and simpli￿es the model tremendously. Potentially, this trick can also be applied when
studying other economic problems. In the literature on industry dynamics, for example,
analytical solutions are rare and numerical simulations necessary.6
1Thus, such games are subclasses of stochastic games. For overviews, see Ba‚ sar and Olsder (1999) or
Dockner et al. (2000).
2In experiments, players tend toward Markov perfect strategies rather than supporting the best sub-
game perfect equilibrium (Battaglini et al., 2010).
3This follows if private provisions are strategic substitutes (as in Fershtman and Nitzan, 1991, and
Levhari and Mirman, 1980). If they were complements, e.g., due to a discrete public project, e¢ ciency
is more easily obtained (Marx and Matthews, 2000).
4For a comprehensive overview, see Engwerda (2005).
5See also Dockner and Long (1993), Dockner and Sorger (1996), and Sorger (1998).
6See the survey by Doraszelski and Pakes (2007). A ￿rm typically overinvests in capacity to get a
competitive advantage. While Reynolds (1987) restricts attention to the linear MPE in a linear-quadratic
model, simple two-stage games are used by d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to discuss the bene￿ts of
6My second contribution, made possible by the ￿rst, is to incorporate incomplete con-
tracts in dynamic games. Few papers allow for policies or negotiation in stochastic games.7
In Battaglini and Coate (2007), legislators negotiate spending on "pork" and a long-lasting
public good. The equilibrium public-good level is suboptimally but strategically low to
discourage future coalitions from wasting money on pork. This mechanism relies on ma-
jority rule, however, and the contract incompleteness is related to future policies rather
than current investments.
2.2. Contract Theory
By permitting contracts on emissions but not on investments, this paper is in line with
the literature on incomplete contracts (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1988). Since I assume
investments are sel￿sh in that they a⁄ect only the investor￿ s technology stock, contracting
on quantity would implement e¢ ciency if there were only one period, or if the contract
lasted forever. However, if the countries cannot commit to the end of time, I ￿nd that
investments are lower if the contract length is short, and that investments decrease toward
the end of a contract. To encourage more investments, the optimal and equilibrium
contract is tougher to comply with if the contract is short-term or close to its expiration
date, particularly if the technology is long-lasting compared to the length of the agreement.
These results have not been detected earlier, to the best of my knowledge.
In other dynamic settings, hold-up problems may be solved if the parties can invest
while negotiating and agreements can be made only once (Che and Sakovics, 2004), or if
there are multiple equilibria in the continuation game (Evans, 2008). Neither requirement
is met in this paper, however.
The results hold also if renegotiation is permitted. When renegotiation is possible,
moral hazard problems are often expected to worsen (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990). But
Chung (1991) and Aghion et al. (1994) have shown how the initial contract can provide
cooperation and by Gatsios and Karp (1992) to show that ￿rms may invest more if they anticipate future
merger negotiations. When allowing negotiations on price, but not on investments, in a more general
setting, Fershtman and Pakes (2000) use numerical analysis.
7For example, Hoel (1993) studies a di⁄erential game with an emission tax, Yanase (2006) derives the
optimal contribution subsidy, Houba et al. (2000) analyze negotiations over (￿sh) quotas lasting forever,
while Sorger (2006) studies one-period agreements. Although Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) even allow for
R&D, contracts are complete or absent in all these papers.
7incentives by a⁄ecting the bargaining position associated with particular investments.8
While these models have only one period, Guriev and Kvasov (2005) present a dynamic
moral hazard problem emphasizing the termination time. Their contract is renegotiated
at every point in time, to keep the remaining time horizon constant. Contribution levels
are not negotiated, but contracting on time is quite similar to contracting on quantity,
as studied by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996): to increase investments, Guriev and Kvasov
let the contract length increase, while Edlin and Reichelstein let the contracted quantity
increase. In this paper, agents can contract on quantity (of emissions) as well as on time,
which permits the study of how the two interact. I also allow an arbitrary number of
agents, in contrast to the buyer-seller situations in these papers.
3. The Model
3.1. Stocks and Preferences
This section presents a game where a set of N ￿ f1;:::;ng agents contribute over time
to a public bad while they also invest in technology. The public bad is represented by
the stock G. Allowing for a more or less long-lasting stock, let 1 ￿ qG 2 [0;1] measure
the fraction of G that "depreciates" from one period to the next. The stock G may
nevertheless increase, depending on the contribution or "emission" level gi from agent
i 2 N:




Parameter G￿ represents the level of the public bad left from the previous period; sub-
scripts for periods are thus skipped.
Each agent i 2 N bene￿ts privately from emitting gi. For example, if G measures the
level of greenhouse gases, gi is fossil-fuel consumption by country i. As an alternative
to fossil fuel, i may consume renewable energy. Let the technology stock Ri measure
how much energy i can produce using its renewable energy sources. Thus, Ri can be
interpreted as the capacity of the "windmill park" in country i. The stock Ri might also
8Segal and Whinston (2002) generalize many related models.
8depreciate over time, at the rate 1 ￿ qR 2 [0;1]. Each "windmill" costs K units, and ri
measures how much i invests in its technology stock. Thus, if Ri;￿ measures i￿ s technology
stock in the previous period, its current technology is given by:
Ri = qRRi;￿ + ri: (3.2)
Since the technology can generate Ri units of energy, the total amount consumed by i is
given by
yi = gi + Ri. (3.3)
As an alternative interpretation, Ri may measure i￿ s "abatement technology," i.e., the
amount by which i can at no cost reduce (or clean) its potential emissions. If energy
production, measured by yi, is otherwise polluting, the actual emission level of country i
is given by gi = yi ￿ Ri, which again implies equality (3.3). For either interpretation, i￿ s
technology provides a private substitute to contributing to the public bad.
The investment stages and the pollution stages alternate over time. De￿ne "a period"
to be such that the countries ￿rst simultaneously invest in technology, after which they
simultaneously decide how much to emit (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The de￿nition of a period
Let the bene￿t of consumption be given by the increasing and concave function B (yi).
If C (G) is an increasing convex function representing each country￿ s cost of the public
bad, i￿ s utility in a period is:
ui = B (yi) ￿ C (G) ￿ Kri:






9where ￿ is the common discount factor and Ui;t is i￿ s continuation value as measured at
the start of period t. As mentioned, subscripts denoting period t are typically skipped
when this is not confusing.
For alternative applications, one could interpret ￿G as a public good and ￿gi as i￿ s
contribution. The marginal bene￿t of the public good is then C0 > 0, but the private
marginal cost of contributing to the public good is B0 (Ri ￿ (￿gi)) > 0. Naturally, this
marginal cost increases in the contribution level ￿gi, but declines in the (cost-reducing)
technology Ri. Sections 5 and 6 discuss how the model can be extended, and the results
survive, if we allow for technological spillovers, uncertainty, and heterogeneity.
3.2. The Equilibrium Concept
As in most stochastic games, attention is restricted to Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs)
where strategies are conditioned on the physical stocks only. As in Maskin and Tirole
(2001), I look for the coarsest set of such strategies. Maskin and Tirole (2001: 192-3)
defend MPEs since they are "often quite successful in eliminating or reducing a large mul-
tiplicity of equilibria," and they "prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent
with rationality" while capturing the fact that "bygones are bygones more completely than
does the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium." In this model, the MPE turns out to be
unique and coinciding with the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium if time were ￿nite and
approaching in￿nity. This result is desirable; in fact, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 533)
have suggested that "one might require in￿nite-horizon MPE to be limits of ￿nite-horizon
MPE."
If the agents are negotiating a contract, I assume the outcome is e¢ cient and sym-
metric if the payo⁄-relevant variables are symmetric across agents. These assumptions
are weak and satis￿ed in several situations. For example, we could rely on cooperative
solution concepts, such as the Nash Bargaining Solution (with or without side transfers).
Alternatively, consider a noncooperative bargaining game where one agent can make a
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the others, and side transfers are feasible. If every agent has
the same chance of being recognized as the proposal-maker, the equilibrium contract is
exactly as described below.
10All countries participate in the contract in equilibrium, since there is no stage at which
they can commit to not negotiating with the others.
4. Analysis
For future reference, the ￿rst-best emission level g￿
i ex post (taking the stocks R1;:::;Rn




0 ￿ ￿UG) > 0; where (4.1)
B
0 ￿ @B (g
￿
i + Ri)=@gi, C
0 ￿ @C (G)=@G, UG = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=n:
Implicitly, the g￿
is are functions of G￿ and fR1;:::Rng: The ￿rst-best investment level
equalizes the marginal bene￿t to the marginal cost, recognizing that more investments
today reduce the need to invest in the next period:
B
0 (gi + R
￿
i) = (1 ￿ ￿qR)K: (4.2)
By substituting (4.2) in (4.1), we ￿nd the ￿rst-best public bad level:
C
0 (G) = (1 ￿ ￿qG)(1 ￿ ￿qR)K: (4.3)
Combined with (3.1), equation (4.3) pins down
P
N gi. Since (4.2) implies that yi is





















Given the gis, (4.2) determines the ￿rst-best R￿
is which, with (3.2), determine the ￿rst-best
ris. Throughout the analysis, I assume that gi ￿ 0 and ri ￿ 0 never bind.9
9In every equilibrium considered below, gi > 0 and ri > 0 always hold. Thus, it can be veri￿ed in
retrospect that the constraints will never bind.
114.1. The Noncooperative Outcome
In principle, the continuation value Ui is a function of the n+1 stocks G￿ and fR1;:::;Rng.
However, note that choosing gi is equivalent to choosing yi, once the Ris are sunk. Sub-
stituting (3.3) into (3.1), we get:
G = qGG￿ +
X
N
yi ￿ R. (4.5)
This way, the Ris are eliminated from the model: they are payo⁄-irrelevant as long as
R ￿
P
N Ri is given, and i￿ s Markov perfect strategy for yi is thus not conditioned on
them.10 A country￿ s continuation value Ui is thus a function of G￿ and R￿, not Ri;￿￿Rj;￿,
and we can therefore write it as U (G￿;R￿), without the subscript i.
Because of the linear investment cost, it turns out that the continuation value U must
be linear in both payo⁄-relevant stocks, even though ui is nonlinear in G. This linearity
makes the model tractable and simple to work with. Furthermore, the linearity permits
only one equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium properties:
(i) There is a unique symmetric MPE.
(ii) The equilibrium is in stationary strategies.
(iii) The continuation value Ui (G;R1;:::Rn) = U (G;R) is linear in the stocks, with:
UR = qRK=n and
UG = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=n: (4.6)
Proposition 1, along with the other results, is proven in the appendix.11 The rest of
this section describes the equilibrium in more detail.
10This follows from the de￿nition by Maskin and Tirole (2001, p. 202), where Markov strategies are
measurable with respect to the coarsest partition of histories consistent with rationality.
11As the proposition states, this is the unique symmetric MPE. Since the investment cost is linear,
there also exist asymmetric MPEs in which the countries invest di⁄erent amounts. Asymmetric equilibria
may not be reasonable when countries are homogeneous, and they would cease to exist if the investment
cost were convex.
12At the emission stage, when the technologies are sunk, i solves
max
yi
B (yi) ￿ C (G) + ￿U (G;R) s.t. (4.5) )
B
0 (yi) = C
0 ￿ ￿UG: (4.7)
First, note that each country pollutes too much compared to the ￿rst best (4.1). The
marginal bene￿t of polluting, B0 (gi + Ri), decreases in gi and it can be interpreted as the
shadow value of polluting one more unit, ￿xing the total level of emission. Thus, B0 would
be the equilibrium permit price if the emission quotas were tradable across the countries
(allowing for such trade would not alter the results). In the noncooperative equilibrium,
each country limits its emission (since B0 > 0), but it internalizes only 1=n of the total
harm.
Second, (4.7) veri￿es that each i chooses the same yi, no matter the Ris. While perhaps
surprising at ￿rst, the intuition is straightforward. Every country has the same preference
for (and marginal bene￿t from) consuming yi, and the marginal cost, through G; is also
the same for every country: one additional consumed unit generates one unit of public
bad.12
Substituting (4.5) in (4.7) implies that a larger R must increase every yi. This implies
that if Ri increases but Rj, j 6= i, is constant, then gj = yj ￿ Rj must increase. Further-
more, substituting (3.3) in (4.7) implies that if Ri increases, gi must decrease. In sum, if
country i has better technology, i pollutes less but (because of this) other countries pol-
lute more. In addition, in the next period all countries invest less. Clearly, these e⁄ects
discourage countries from investing.
Proposition 2. Investments:





j 8i;j 2 f1;:::ng8Ri;Rj: (4.8)
(ii) If i invests more, i pollutes less but j 6= i pollutes more, and everyone invests less the
12This follows from (3.3), and would not necessarily be true if I instead had focused on technologies that
reduced the emission content of each produced unit (e.g., gi = yi=Ri). The additive form (3.3) is chosen
- not only because it simpli￿es the analysis tremendously - but also because the resulting crowding-out
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nC00 ￿ B00 > 0 8j 6= i; (4.10)
@r
no
i =@R￿ = ￿qR=n. (4.11)
(iii) Consequently, investments are too low, compared to the ￿rst best.
Results (i)-(ii) mean that a country￿ s technology stock is, in e⁄ect, a public good. A
larger Ri raises every country￿ s consumption and reduces every investment in the following
period. Since i captures only 1=n of the bene￿ts, i invests less than optimally.
At the emission stage, as already noted, a country consumes too much since it does
not take into account the harm imposed on the other countries. In addition, the appendix
shows that, in equilibrium, ri increases in G￿. Anticipating this, a country may want to
pollute a lot in order to induce the other countries to invest more in the next period.13
Proposition 3. Emissions and consumption:
(i) If i pollutes more, every j 2 N invests more in the following period:
@r
no
i =@G￿ = qG=n: (4.12)
(ii) Emission levels are too large compared to the ￿rst best.
(iii) Nevertheless, the equilibrium consumption level yi is lower than it would be in the
￿rst best.
Part (iii) states that the reduction in ri always dominates the increase in gi, such that
the consumption level yi = gi + Ri is always less in the noncooperative equilibrium than
the ￿rst-best level of yi. With these dynamic e⁄ects, this common-pool problem is more
severe than its static counterpart (or than the open-loop equilibrium).14
13Adding to the public good ￿G (by reducing gi) or to R (by increasing ri) has somewhat similar e⁄ects.
However, they are not equivalent since a larger ri reduces emissions in every future period. Increasing
ri thus has a longer-lasting impact than reducing gi, which is why ri is referred to as an investment.
Moreover, the next sections let gi be contractible but not ri.
14This is also the case in Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1991), for example, and it is veri￿ed in experiments by
Battaglini et al. (2010).
144.2. Negotiations and Incomplete Contracts
From now on, I let the countries negotiate and contract on their contributions to the
public bad. Whether a country i complies by reducing its current consumption or by
investing in a more long-term solution is up to country i. The other countries may, in any
case, ￿nd it hard to verify which course was chosen.
The model can (and will) be used to analyze agreements of any length. In this subsec-
tion, countries negotiate and contract in the beginning of each period. Thus, the period
length is de￿ned by the contract length. Obviously, each period and contract can be
arbitrarily long, since I have not speci￿ed the level of the discount factor, for example.
In each period, the timing is the following. First, the countries negotiate a vector
of contribution levels gi. Thereafter, each country sets ri and, ￿nally, every country
complies with the contract. As mentioned, I assume the bargaining outcome is e¢ cient
and symmetric if the game itself is symmetric. If negotiations fail, the countries play
noncooperatively.
The bargaining game is indeed symmetric, even if Ri;￿ di⁄ers across the countries.
Just as in Section 4.1, the Ri;￿s are eliminated from the model and the continuation value
is a function of only G￿ and R￿ ￿
P
N Ri;￿. Moreover, the linear investment cost implies
that U must be linear in both stocks, pinning down a unique equilibrium. In fact, the
equilibrium properties simplifying the analysis above continue to hold with incomplete
contracts. In particular, there is a unique MPE and the continuation value is linear, with
the same slopes as before.
Proposition 4. Equilibrium properties (Proposition 1 continues to hold):
(i) There is a unique MPE.
(ii) The equilibrium is in stationary strategies.
(iii) The continuation value Ui (G;R1;:::Rn) = U (G;R) is linear in the stocks, with:
UR = qRK=n and
UG = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=n:
15When investing, i 2 N prefers a larger stock of technology if its quota, gco
i , is small,
since otherwise its consumption level would be very low. Consequently, ri decreases in
gco
i . For a given gco






i ) = K ￿ ￿UR = K (1 ￿ ￿qR=n): (4.13)
In contrast to the noncooperative game, Ri is no longer a public good: once the emission
levels are pinned down, i￿ s investment increases yi but not yj, j 6= i. However, the technol-
ogy that survives to the next period, qRRi, does become a public good, since, for a ￿xed R,
the continuation value at the start of every period is independent of Ri. Intuitively, if the
agreement does not last forever, a country anticipates that good technology will worsen
its bargaining position in the future, once a new agreement is to be negotiated. At that
stage, good technology leads to a lower gi;+ since the other countries can hold i up when
it is cheap for i to reduce its emissions.15 In fact, yi;+ is going to be the same across the
is, no matter what the di⁄erences are in the Ris. This discourages i from investing now,
particularly if the current agreement is relatively short (￿ large), the technology likely to
survive (qR large), and the number of countries n large. Thus, compared to the ￿rst best
(4.2), countries still underinvest if ￿qR > 0.
Proposition 5. Investments:
(i) Country i 2 N invests more if the contract is tough: @ri=@gco
i = ￿1.
(ii) Nevertheless, for any given gco
i , i underinvests if the agreement is relatively short-
lasting (￿ > 0) while the technology long-lasting (qR > 0).
Thus, if ￿ and qR are large, it is important to encourage more investments. On the
one hand, this can be achieved by a small gco
i . On the other, the ex-post optimal gco
i
is larger when equilibrium investments are low. The optimal gco
i s must trade o⁄ these
concerns. As shown in the appendix, the equilibrium and optimal gco
i s must satisfy (4.4):
the equilibrium quotas are identical to the ￿rst-best levels!16
15Or, if no agreement is expected in the future, a large Ri;+ reduces gi;+ and increases gj;+, as proven
in Section 4.1.
16Technically, the reason is that yi is in equilibrium independent of gco
i , since @Ri=@gco
i = ￿1. Thus,
the marginal costs and bene￿ts of increasing gco
i have the same levels as in the ￿rst-best scenario, in
which the e⁄ect on yi can be ignored using the envelope theorem.
16However, since (4.13) implies that the equilibrium Rco
i s are less than optimal, the glt
i s
are suboptimally low ex post. Combining (4.3) and (4.13) gives
B
0 = n(C
0 ￿ ￿UG) + (1 ￿ 1=n)K￿qR: (4.14)
Not only is the shadow value of polluting, B0, larger than in the noncooperative case, but
it is even larger than it would be in the ￿rst best, (4.1). For a ￿xed investment level,
optimally gco
i should have satis￿ed B0 = n(C0 ￿ ￿UG) rather than (4.14). Only then would
marginal costs and bene￿ts be equalized. Relative to this ex-post optimal level, the gco
i
satisfying (4.14) must be lower since B0 ￿ n(C0 ￿ ￿UG) decreases in gco
i . If n, qR, and ￿
are large, the additional term (1 ￿ 1=n)K￿qR is large, and gco
i must decline. This makes
the contract more demanding or tougher to satisfy at the emission stage, compared to
what is ex post optimal. The purpose of committing to such an overambitious agreement
is to encourage investments, since these are suboptimally low when n, qR, and ￿ are large.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium contract:
(i) The contracted emission levels are equal to the levels at the ￿rst best (4.4).
(ii) But the emission levels are lower than what is ex post optimal (4.1) if the agreement
is short-term (￿ > 0) while the technology is long-lasting (qR > 0).
Figure 2: The shorter the agreement, the lower is the contracted emission level relative
to the ex post optimum
17Figure 2 illustrates the main result: if the length of the agreement is relatively short, ￿ and
qR are large, and the quotas should be much smaller relative to the emission levels that
are ex post optimal. For example, suppose B (yi) = ￿b(y ￿ yi)
2 =2 and C (G) = cG2=2.
If g￿







￿qRK (1 ￿ 1=n)
b + cn2 :
On the other hand, if ￿qR = 0, the right-hand side of (4.14) is zero, meaning that the
commitments under the best long-term agreement also maximize the expected utility ex
post. In this case, the countries are not concerned with how current technologies a⁄ect
future bargaining power, either because the existing agreement is lasting forever (￿ = 0),
or because the technology will not survive the length of the contract (qR = 0). Investments
are ￿rst best and there is no need to distort the gco
i s downwards.
4.3. Multiperiod Contracts
Assume now that at the beginning of period 1, the countries negotiate the gi;ts for every
period t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg. The time horizon T may be limited by the countries￿ability to
commit to future promises.
Just as before, the payo⁄-relevant stocks at the start of period 1 are G￿ and R￿ only.
Once again, this simpli￿es the analysis. There is a unique MPE, the continuation value
at the start of period 1 (and T + 1) is linear in the stocks, and has the same slopes as
before.
Proposition 7. Equilibrium properties (Proposition 1 continues to hold):
(i) There is a unique MPE.
(ii) The equilibrium is in stationary strategies.
(iii) The continuation value Ui (G;R1;:::Rn) = U (G;R) is linear in the stocks, with:
UR = qRK=n and
UG = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=n:
When investing in period t 2 f1;2;:::;Tg, countries take the gi;ts as given, and the
continuation value in period T +1 is U(GT;RT). At the last investment stage, i￿ s problem
18is the same as in Section 3.2 and i invests until (4.13) holds. Anticipating this, i can
invest less in period T by investing more in period T ￿1. The net investment cost is thus
K (1 ￿ ￿qR). The same logic applies to every previous period and, in equilibrium,
B
0 (gi;t + Ri;t) = K (1 ￿ ￿qR) for t < T: (4.15)
Thus, the incentives to invest are larger earlier than in the last period, given by (4.13).
In fact, investments are equal to the ￿rst best (4.2) for every t < T.17
Proposition 8. Investments:
(i) Investments decrease toward the end of the agreement.
(ii) They are socially optimal for t < T, but suboptimally low in the last period.
Intuitively, the countries invest less when future negotiations are coming up because of
the hold-up problem, but they invest more (and optimally) if the emission levels are pinned
down for the next period as well. All this is anticipated when the countries negotiate the
gi;ts.
As shown in the appendix, the optimal and equilibrium gi;ts must satisfy (4.3) for
every t ￿ T: the equilibrium pollution level is similar to the ￿rst-best level, for every
period!
In the beginning of the agreement, when t < T, the gi;ts are ex post optimal as well,
since the investments are ￿rst best. In the last period, however, investments decline and
the contracted emission levels are lower than the ex-post optimal levels. In other words,
the optimal contract becomes tougher to satisfy toward its end (and the shadow value of
polluting, or the permit price, B0, increases).
Proposition 9. The equilibrium contract:
17Since RT < RT￿1, investments may be negative in period T. The condition for when investments
are always positive is:
X
N
ri = RT ￿ qRRT￿1 = B0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR=n)) ￿ gco
i;T ￿ qRB0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR)) + gco
i;T￿1
= B0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR=n)) ￿ qRB0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR))
￿(1 ￿ qR)(1 ￿ qG)
1
n
C0￿1 [(1 ￿ ￿qG)(1 ￿ ￿qR)K] > 0:
19(i) For every period, the contracted emission levels equal the ￿rst-best levels (4.4).
(ii) Since investments are suboptimally low in the last period, the contract becomes tougher
to satisfy toward the end, and emission levels are then too low, relative to the ex post
optimum (4.1), if ￿qR > 0.
4.4. Renegotiation
The contracts above are not renegotiation-proof, since they specify emission levels that are
less than what is optimal ex post, after the investments are sunk. The countries may thus
be tempted to renegotiate the treaty. This section derives equilibria when renegotiation
is costless.
Starting with one-period contracts, the timing in each period is the following. First,
the countries negotiate the initial commitments, the gde
i s, referred to as "the default." If
these negotiations fail, it is natural to assume that the threat point is no agreement.18
Thereafter, the countries invest. Before carrying out their commitments, the countries
get together and renegotiate the gde
i s. Relative to the threat point gde
i , the bargaining
surplus is assumed to be split equally in expectation. As before, this bargaining outcome
is implemented by, for example, randomly letting one country make a take-it-or-leave-it
o⁄er regarding quantities and transfers.
Figure 3: The timing when renegotiation is possible
At the start of each period, any di⁄erence in technology is payo⁄-irrelevant and the
continuation value is a function of G￿ and R￿ only, just as before. Moreover, this contin-
uation value is linear in the stocks, leading to a unique equilibrium. For this game also,
the earlier appealing equilibrium properties continue to hold.
18However, if the threat point were "short-term" agreements, negotiated after the investment stage,
the outcome would be identical.
20Proposition 10. Equilibrium properties (Proposition 1 continues to hold):
(i) There is a unique MPE.
(ii) The equilibrium is in stationary strategies.
(iii) The continuation value Ui (G;R1;:::Rn) = U (G;R) is linear in the stocks, with:
UR = qRK=n and
UG = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=n:
Renegotiation ensures that emission levels are ex post optimal, in contrast to the
contracts discussed above. When investing, a country anticipates that it will not, in the
end, have to comply with an overambitious contract. Will this jeopardize the incentives
to invest?
Not necessarily. When renegotiating an ambitious agreement, countries that have
invested little are desperate to reach a new agreement that would replace the tough
initial commitments. Such countries have a poor bargaining position, and so they will, in
equilibrium, compensate the others for relaxing the quotas. Fearing this, all countries are
induced to invest more, particularly if the default emission levels are small.
Proposition 11. Investments:
Country i￿ s investment level ri decreases in the initial quota gde
i .
This is anticipated when negotiating the initial agreement, the gde
i s. The more ambi-
tious this agreement is, the more the countries invest. This is desirable if the countries
are otherwise tempted to underinvest. Thus, the agreement should be more ambitious if
￿ and qR are large. Since the investments are in￿ uenced by the initial agreement, the gde
i s
can always be set such that the investments are ￿rst best. In any case, the emission levels
remain optimal, thanks to renegotiation. In sum, the optimal and equilibrium contract
implements the ￿rst best.
Proposition 12. The equilibrium contract:
(i) The initial contract satis￿es (4.16), and it is thus tougher if it is relatively short-term
(￿ large) while the technology is long-lasting (qR large).























To see the second part of (i), note that (4.16) requires that gde
i decreases in ￿qR since
R￿
i is increasing in ￿qR. Intuitively, if the length of the agreement is short, countries fear
that more technology today will hurt their bargaining position in the near future. They
thus invest less than what is optimal, unless the agreement is more ambitious.
Figure 4: The shorter the agreement, the lower is the contracted emission level relative
to the ex post optimum
This result is illustrated in Figure 4, and it con￿rms the comparative static for the
case without renegotiation (Proposition 6).
Compared to the optimal contract without renegotiation, given by (4.14), the initial
agreement should be tougher when renegotiation is possible (gde
i < gco
i ). Intuitively,
without renegotiation the contract balances the concern for investments (by reducing gco
i )
and for ex-post e¢ ciency (where gi should be larger). The latter concern is irrelevant
when renegotiation ensures ex-post optimality, so the initial contract can be tougher -
indeed, so tough that investments are ￿rst best.
Corollary 1. The initial contract under renegotiation (4.16) is tougher and speci-
￿es lower emission levels than the equilibrium contract when renegotiation is not possible
(4.14).
22Implementation:
Note that the equilibrium outcome is observationally equivalent to a time-inconsistency
problem where the countries make ambitious plans for the future, while repeatedly backing
down from promises made in the past. But rather than re￿ ecting a time-inconsistency
problem, this actually leads to the ￿rst best.
Corollary 2. In equilibrium, the countries repeatedly promise to pollute little in the
future but when the future arrives, they renege on these promises. This procedure imple-
ments the ￿rst best.
Multiple periods:
If the countries can negotiate and commit to a T-period agreement, we know from Section
4.3 that investments (and consumption) are ￿rst best in every period - except for the
last. Thus, the contracted quantities are also ex-post optimal, and there is no need to
renegotiate them. It is only in the last period that the quantities are lower than what is
optimal ex post, and only then is there an incentive to renegotiate the contract. When the
countries anticipate that the contract will be renegotiated in the last period, they do not
need to trade o⁄the concern for ex-post e¢ ciency for the need to encourage investments,
and the initial contract can be tougher, and in fact so tough that investments are ￿rst
best, even in the last period.
Thus, when renegotiation is possible, for every period but the last the optimal and
equilibrium initial contract speci￿es the ex-post optimal quantities, and these are also
equal to the ￿rst-best quantities since investments are optimal for t < T. The initial
contract for the last period, t = T, is given by (4.16), just as in the one-period contract
with renegotiation. As before, the initial contract becomes tougher to satisfy towards its
end, since the initial quotas are smaller in the last period than in the earlier periods.19
Proposition 13. Multiple periods and renegotiation:
19To see this, note that the last-period contract (4.16) can be compared to the earlier (￿rst-best)






= K (1 ￿ ￿qR).
23(i) For t < T; the equilibrium initial contract is given by gde
i;t = g￿
i but for t = T, the
contract is tougher and given by (4.16).
(ii) This contract is renegotiated only after the investment stage in the last period.
(iii) The ￿rst best is implemented by any T-period contract, T ￿ 1, when renegotiation is
possible.
5. Technological Spillovers
In the benchmark case above, investments were sel￿sh. For some applications, however,
it might be reasonable that i bene￿ts from j￿ s investments. Coe and Helpman (1995) ￿nd
that technological spillovers are empirically important, and they let spillovers have an
additive impact. Thus, if a larger ri increases Ri directly by d units, suppose Rj increases
by e units, 8j 2 Nni. Parameter e ￿ 0 measures the technological spillover. The total
impact of ri on R is D ￿ d + e(n ￿ 1), and we can write:




The appendix solves the model for any e.
In the noncooperative case, the level of e turns out to be irrelevant for investments as
well as for consumption. The reason is that Ri is, in any case, a perfect public good, no
matter the level of e.
Suppose, next, that countries negotiate emission levels but that renegotiation is not
possible. Once the emission levels are pinned down, then a positive e implies that j can
consume more if i invests. This externality is a second reason that i invests suboptimally
little - in addition to the hold-up problem emphasized so far. The larger e is, the lower
the investment levels are, compared to the ￿rst-best level. The reduction in investments
implies that it is ex post optimal to pollute more. On the other hand, by negotiating
smaller emission levels, the countries invest more, and this is bene￿cial for everyone when
the countries invest suboptimally little because of e > 0. Balancing these concerns, it
turns out that the optimal G and gi are independent of e, given D. In any case, the
equilibrium contract speci￿es the emission levels given by (4.3)-(4.4), as would have been
￿rst best if investments had been e¢ cient.
24But since investments are suboptimally low, the negotiated gis are lower than what is
ex post optimal. In the one-period contract analyzed in Section 4.2, the appendix shows
that the contracted quotas will satisfy:
B
0 ￿ n(C




e(1 ￿ ￿qR)(n ￿ 1) + ￿qR (1 ￿ 1=n)
D ￿ e(n ￿ 1)
￿
: (5.1)
After the investments are sunk, it would be (ex-post) optimal to pollute more and so
much that the left-hand side were equal to zero. Compared to this ex-post optimal level,
the agreement should be tougher and more ambitious when e is large. For multiperiod
contracts, (5.1) would be satis￿ed for the last period, when t = T. For the earlier periods,
t < T, the optimal and equilibrium quotas will satisfy:
B
0 ￿ n(C




e(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿qR)
D ￿ e(n ￿ 1)
￿
: (5.2)
Thus, when the spillover is positive, the optimal agreement is "overambitious" for every
period, not only the last.
When renegotiation is possible, the ￿rst best is still obtainable by the appropriate
























K (1 ￿ ￿qR)
D ￿ en
: (5.4)
To achieve the ￿rst best, note that even the multiperiod contract must be renegotiated in
every period when e > 0. In that case, a multiperiod contract is overambitious in order to
motivate R&D, and for every period it speci￿es emission levels that are lower than those
that are optimal once the investments are sunk. While this encourages investments, it
also necessitates renegotiation.
To summarize, for all these cases, a larger spillover implies that the contract should
be tougher relative to the level that is ex-post optimal.20
20For the one-period contract, this ￿nding is also detected by Golombek and Hoel (2005). When
renegotiation is possible, a related result is derived for the buyer-seller game in Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996). If e ￿ d, however, the ￿rst best can never be implemented, a ￿nding which is in line with Che
and Hausch (1999). However, all these contributions limit their attention to one-period models.
25Proposition 14. The larger is the technological spillover e, the tougher is the optimal
and equilibrium contract relative to the ex post optimum. The T-period contract is given
by:
(i) condition (5.1) for t = T if renegotiation is impossible;
(ii) condition (5.2) for t < T if T > 1 and renegotiation is impossible;
(iii) condition (5.3) for t = T if renegotiation is possible;
(iv) condition (5.4) for t < T if T > 1 and renegotiation is possible.
6. Generalizations and Extensions
One purpose of this paper is to present a model that is simple and tractable, despite
the complexity of the underlying problem. The results are robust to several generaliza-
tions, and the model can fruitfully be expanded in various directions. This section brie￿ y
describes some of these extensions.
6.1. Robustness to the Future Regime
When analyzing a particular game, I have so far assumed that the identical game repeats
itself after one period or contract has expired. Obviously, the equilibrium in a given period
is a function of the future continuation-value function. However, while the derivatives UR
and UG determine the incentives to invest and to pollute, the level of U is irrelevant for
these choices. For all the regimes analyzed above, it turned out that UR and UG were
constant and identical: Proposition 1 continued to hold throughout the analysis. Thus,
the equilibrium for a given period or contract is unchanged if, in the next period, the
countries play noncooperatively or instead negotiate a contract (of any length, with or
without renegotiation).
Corollary 3. For each period, every equilibrium derived above remains unchanged
whether the countries in the next (or any future) period (i) act noncooperatively, (ii) ne-
gotiate one-period contracts, (iii) negotiate multiperiod contracts, or (iv) negotiate default
contracts that will be renegotiated later.
266.2. Adding Uncertainty
While the model above is deterministic, certain types of uncertainty leave the results
unchanged. Since the continuation values are linear in R, countries are risk-neutral in
that it would not matter if, say, the depreciation rate on technology were random, as long
as the expected depreciation rate is 1￿qR. The realized depreciation can also be di⁄erent
for every country, as long as the expected depreciation rate is 1 ￿ qR for everyone. In
addition, the cost of pollution at time t may depend on some state ￿t such that it could be
written C (Gt;￿t). Again, Propositions 1-14 continue to hold if one simply replaces C0 in
every expression by the expected marginal cost, EC0, where the expectations are taken with
respect to the unknown future ￿t. Since C (:) is strictly convex, EC0 (Gt;￿t) > C0 (Gt;E￿t),
and Gt should thus be smaller when ￿t is uncertain. One can thus expect that, for a T-
period agreement, the optimal gi;ts should decrease in t due to the (increased) uncertainty
in ￿t. This strengthens the conclusion that a long-term agreement should become tougher
to satisfy over time.
6.3. Endogenizing the Contract Length
Above, I have taken the contract￿ s length, T, to be exogenous. This may be reasonable if
T measures the length of time to which the countries can commit. If the countries could
choose, they would always prefer T to be as large as possible.
This would no longer be true, however, if uncertainty were added to the model. If ￿t
in C (Gt;￿t) is stochastic, for example, there is a cost of committing in advance to future
emission levels, if these cannot be renegotiated or conditioned on ￿t. In this case, the
optimal time horizon may be ￿nite.
Alternatively, one may assume that there is a ￿xed cost of negotiating every period￿ s
emission levels. Since the cost of the hold-up problem is realized only in period T, the
present discounted value of this cost is smaller than the ￿xed negotiation cost if T is large.
Thus, such negotiation costs would imply that the optimal T is interior.
Whether T is pinned down by the uncertainty or by the negotiation cost, some com-
parative static is feasible. For example, if the technology is long-lasting (qR is large), the
27hold-up problem in period T is severe and, to delay this cost, the countries may prefer
to increase T. In Harstad (2010), I allow for uncertainty and show how the optimal T
depends on several parameters.
6.4. Heterogeneity
To provide a benchmark case, it has been assumed that the countries are completely
symmetric and there has been no heterogeneity. It did turn out, however, that for a given
R￿, di⁄erences in Ri;￿ (such as Ri;￿ ￿ Rj;￿) were payo⁄-irrelevant. It is therefore not
necessary to assume that all countries start out with the same technology.
Furthermore, some heterogeneity can easily be added to the model. For example, if
country i￿ s bene￿t of consumption is measured relative to some individual bliss point or
reference point yi, we could write i￿ s bene￿t as B (yi ￿ yi). If we de￿ne e yi ￿ yi￿yi, every
result above holds if yi is substituted by e yi. While countries with large yi are going to
consume more in every equilibrium, i￿ s consumption relative to its reference point is going
to be constant across the countries.
6.5. Contractible Investments
If the countries negotiated investments but not emission levels, then deriving the best
incomplete contract would require an analysis somewhat similar to that above. If both
investments and emission levels were contractible, the ￿rst best could be implemented
trivially, even without renegotiation. One way of implementing the ￿rst best is then to
subsidize investments across countries. Without subsidies, investments are suboptimally
low, particularly if the technology is long-lasting and the contract short-lasting or close to
its expiration date. To ensure optimal investments, the subsidy should thus be larger for
contracts that have a short time horizon and when they are close to expiring (for details,
see Harstad, 2010).
286.6. Participation
In this paper, I have assumed that the agents cannot hide when negotiating a contract.
Dixit and Olson (2000), on the other hand, study a two-stage game in which the agents ￿rst
decide whether to participate in the second cooperative stage. With such a possibility of
opting out, many agents prefer to abstain and free-ride. Thus, one might expect less than
full participation in the present model as well, if such a stage were added to the model.
However, in contrast to Dixit and Olson, the present game has several periods. Thus,
if only a few agents decide to participate, they may prefer to contract for fewer periods,
hoping that the nonparticipants will turn up later. Since short-term contracts lead to
suboptimal investments, this (credible!) threat may discourage agents from considering
to free-ride. Thus, participation may be larger than in the two-stage model of Dixit and
Olson. Future research should investigate this conjecture - along with many other possible
extensions.
7. Conclusions
This paper presents a novel dynamic game in which n agents contribute to a public bad
while also investing in substitute technologies. Under the assumption of linear investment
costs, the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is unique, the continuation value linear, and
the analysis tractable, despite the n + 1 stocks. While the unique equilibrium rules out
self-enforcing agreements, the framework can be employed to analyze incomplete contracts
in a dynamic setting.
With only one period, or if the contract lasted forever, contracting on contribution
levels would be ￿rst best since investments are "sel￿sh" in (most of) the paper. If the
agents cannot commit to the end of time, however, investments are suboptimally low,
particularly if the contract is short-term or close to expiring. To further motivate in-
vestments, the equilibrium and optimal contract is tougher and more ambitious if it is
short-lasting or close to the expiration date. If renegotiation is possible, such a contract
implements the ￿rst best.
While the model and the method are general, the assumptions ￿t well to the context
29of climate change, and the results have important consequences for how to design a treaty.
First, even if the countries can credible commit to emission levels, they will invest too
little in renewable energy sources and abatement technology. As a consequence, the
climate treaty should be more ambitious compared to what is optimal ex post, after the
investments are sunk. In particular, short-term agreements should be more ambitious
than long-term agreements, and the agreement should be tougher towards the end.
Currently, the commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol expire in 2012 and the
threat point for present negotiations is no agreement at all. This reduces the incentive
to invest in new technologies, according to the above results. When the Doha-round
trade negotiations broke down, on the other hand, the default outcome was not the
noncooperative equilibrium but the existing set of long-term trade agreements. Long-
lasting agreements permitting renegotiation can implement the ￿rst best in the above
model. Thus, the procedure used for negotiating trade agreements is more e¢ cient than
the one currently used for climate, according to this analysis.
With this application, the paper provides a small step toward a better understanding
of how climate treaties interact with the incentives to invest in technologies. The analysis
has detected and explored challenges that arise even if we abstract from domestic politics,
heterogeneity across countries, private information, monitoring, compliance, coalition for-
mation, and the possibility of opting out of the agreement. While the e⁄ects discussed
in this paper are likely to persist, allowing for such complications will certainly generate
several new results and thereby enhance our understanding of the best agreement design.
Relaxing these assumptions is thus the natural next step.
308. Appendix
All propositions are here proven allowing for technological spillovers. In Sections 3 and
4, e = 0 and D = d = 1.
While Ui is the continuation value just before the investment stage, let Wi represent the
(interim) continuation value at (or just before) the emission stage. To shorten equations,
use m ￿ ￿￿@Ui=@G￿, z ￿ ￿@Ui=@R￿, e R ￿ qRR￿ and e G ￿ qGG￿. The proof for the ￿rst
best (4.1)-(4.3) is omitted since it would follow the same lines as the following proof.
Proofs of Proposition 1-3.
Note that, by substitution,
G = qgG￿ +
X
N
yi ￿ R; and
ui = B (yi) ￿ C (G) ￿ Kri:
Thus, all i￿ s are identical w.r.t. yi and di⁄erences in the technology stock do not matter.
The game is thus symmetric at the emission stage, no matter di⁄erences in Ri:At the
investment stage, the game is symmetric, no matter di⁄erences in Ri;￿. Analyzing the
symmetric equilibrium (where symmetric countries invest identical amounts), I drop the
subscript for i on U and W.
At the emission stage, each country￿ s ￿rst-order condition for yi is:
0 = B
0 (yi) ￿ C
0 (G) + ￿UG(G;R)
= B
0 (yi) ￿ C
0
 









implying that all yis are identical and implicit functions of e G and R only. At the invest-
ment stage, i maximizes:
W(e G;R) ￿ Kri = W
 






implying that R is going to be a function of G￿, given implicitly by @W(qGG￿;R)=@R =
K=D and explicitly by, say, R(G￿). In the symmetric equilibrium, each country invests
31(R(G￿) ￿ qRR￿)=Dn. Thus:













in every period. Hence, URG = UGR = 0, m and UG cannot be functions of R and (8.1)
implies that yi, G and thus B (yi) ￿ C (G) ￿ ￿ (:) are functions of e G ￿ R only. Hence,
write G
￿
e G ￿ R
￿
. Rewriting (8.2) gives
￿ (qGG￿ ￿ R) + ￿U (G(qGG￿ ￿ R);R) ￿ Kri
and because UR is a deterministic constant, maximizing this payo⁄w.r.t. ri makes qGG￿￿
R a constant, say ￿. This gives @ri=@G￿ = qG=Dn and U becomes:
U (G￿;R￿) = ￿ (￿) ￿ Kr + ￿U (G(￿);R)
= ￿ (￿) ￿ K
￿
qGG￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ qRR￿
Dn
￿
+ ￿U (G(￿);qGG￿ ￿ ￿) )




+ ￿URqG = ￿
KqG
Dn
(1 ￿ ￿qR); (8.4)
since G(￿ + ￿) and ￿ (:) are not functions of G￿ when qGG￿ ￿ R = ￿:
Since UG is a constant, (8.1) implies that if R increases, yi increases but G must
decrease. Thus, @yi=@R 2 (0;1), so @gi=@Rj = @ (yi ￿ Ri)=@Rj > 0 if i 6= j and < 0 if

















nC00 ￿ B00 ￿ 1 = ￿
C00(n ￿ 1) ￿ B00





nC00 ￿ B00 > 0;j 6= i.
Since qGG￿ ￿ R is a constant, when investments are symmetric (4.11)-(4.12) follow.































= (1 ￿ ￿qR=n)K: (8.5)
For a given yi, the left-hand side is smaller and the right-hand side larger than the ￿rst
best (4.2). Thus, yi must be smaller than the yi satisfying (4.2). But since i consumes
more than optimally for a given R, R must be lower than in the ￿rst best. Combined,




0 + ￿UG = (1 ￿ ￿qR=n)K
nC00 ￿ B00
C00 ￿ B00 + ￿UG;
which is clearly larger than the ￿rst best (4.3), since UG is the same in the two cases.
Proofs of Propositions 4-6.
When gi is already negotiated, i invests until
K = dB
0 (gi + Ri) + Dz ) (8.6)
yi = B
0￿1 (K=d ￿ Dz=d); Ri = B
0￿1 (K=d ￿ Dz=d) ￿ gi;
dri = B








0￿1 (K=d ￿ Dz=d)
￿
￿ C (G) ￿ Kri + ￿U (G;R):
If the negotiations fail, the default outcome is the noncooperative outcome, giving every-
one the same utility. Since the ris follow from the gis in (8.7), everyone understands that
negotiating the gis is equivalent to negotiating the ris. Since all countries have identical
preferences w.r.t. the ris (and their default utility is the same) the ris are going to be
equal for every i. Symmetry requires that ri, and thus ￿ ￿ [gi + qRRi;￿], is the same for
all countries. Then, (8.7) becomes
Dri = B
0￿1 (K=d ￿ Dz=d) ￿ ￿:
E¢ ciency requires (f.o.c. of Ui w.r.t. ￿ recognizing gi = ￿￿qRRi;￿ and @ri=@￿ = ￿1=D8i):
￿nC
0 (G) + K=D + n￿UG ￿ nD￿UR(1=D) = 0 )
C
0 (G) + m + zD = K=Dn: (8.8)
33Combined with (8.7), neither G nor R can be functions of R￿ (Ri in (8.7) and G in (8.8) are
not functions of R￿). Thus, UR￿ = qRK=Dn, just as before, and UG cannot be a function
of R (since URG = 0). (8.8) then implies that G is a constant and, since we must have ￿ =
(G ￿ qGG￿)=n+qRR￿=n, (8.7) gives @ri=@G￿ = (@ri=@gi)(@gi=@￿)(@￿=@G￿) = qG=Dn.
Hence, UG￿ = ￿qGK=Dn + ￿URqG = ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=Dn, giving a unique equilibrium,
(8.3) and (8.4), just as before.
Substituted in (8.8):
C
0 (G) = (1 ￿ ￿qG)(1 ￿ ￿qR)K=Dn: (8.9)
This is the same pollution level as in the ￿rst best (4.3). At the same time, for a given
gi, equilibrium investments (8.6) are less than the ￿rst best investments (4.2). Thus, ex
post the marginal bene￿t of polluting is larger than the marginal cost. Anticipating the
ex post small gi, ri increases: from (8.7), @ri=@gi = ￿1. Combining (8.9) with (8.6),
B
0 (gi + Ri ￿ yi)=n ￿ C























1 ￿ (n ￿ 1)e=D
￿ 1 + ￿qR
￿
(D ￿ en)(n ￿ 1)






e + ￿qR (D=n ￿ e)
D=(n ￿ 1) ￿ e
￿
:


































e=D + ￿qR (1=n ￿ e=D)
1=(n ￿ 1) + e=D
￿
:
Proofs of Propositions 7-9.
At the start of t = 1, countries negotiate emission levels for every period t 2 f1;:::;Tg.
The investment level in period T is (8.7) for the same reasons as given above.
Anticipating the equilibrium Ri;T (and Rj;T) i can invest qR less units in period T for
each invested unit in period T ￿ 1. Thus, in period T ￿ 1, i invests until:
K = dB
0 (gi;T￿1 + Ri;T￿1) + ￿qRK ) (8.10)




0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR)=d) ￿ gi;T￿1:(8.11)
34The same argument applies to every period T ￿ t, t 2 f1;:::T ￿ 1g, and the investment
level is given by the analogous equation for each period but T.
In equilibrium, all countries enjoy the same yi and default utilities. Thus, just as
before, they will negotiate the gi;ts such that they will all face the same cost of investment
in equilibrium. Thus, ri = rj = r and
Dr = B
0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR)=d) ￿ gi;t ￿ qRRi;t￿1:
For every t 2 (1;T), Ri;t￿1 is given by the gi;t￿1 in the previous period (in line with (8.11)).
Thus,
Dr = B
0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR)) ￿ gi;t ￿ qR
￿
B
0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR)=d) ￿ gi;t￿1
￿
= (1 ￿ qR)B
0￿1 (K (1 ￿ ￿qR)) ￿ gi;t + qRgi;t￿1: (8.12)




R Ri;￿￿1 = &t; t 2 f1;:::;Tg:
All countries have the same preferences over the &ts. Dynamic e¢ ciency requires that
the countries are not better o⁄ after a change in the &ts (and thus the gi;ts), given by
(￿&t;￿&t+1), such that G is unchanged after two periods, i.e., ￿&tqG = ￿￿&t+1, t 2
[1;T ￿ 1]. From (8.12), this implies
￿nC
0 (Gt)￿&t + ￿gtK=D + ￿ (￿&t+1 ￿ ￿gtqR)K=D ￿ ￿
2￿gt+1qRK=D ￿ 08￿&t )
￿
￿C
0n + K=D ￿ ￿ (qG + qR)K=D + ￿
2qGdRK=D
￿
￿&t ￿ 08￿&t )
￿C




0 (G)n ￿ nm = (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=d ￿ (1 ￿ ￿qR)(1 ￿ ￿qG)K=D ￿ ￿qG (1 ￿ ￿qR)K=D
=
K (1 ￿ ￿qR)
d













1=(n ￿ 1) ￿ e=D
￿
(1 ￿ ￿qR):
The gi;T satis￿es (8.9) for the same reasons as in the previous proof (and since they do
not in￿ uence any Ri;t, t < T). It is easy to check that UR and UG are the same as before.
35Proofs of Propositions 10-12.




































j is j￿ s utility after renegotiation. Maximizing the expectation of this expression






































Clearly, Ri must decrease in gde
i . Requiring ￿rst-best investments, @ (
P
W re
i )=@R = K=D,
and since B0 ￿
gde
i + Ri ￿ yi
￿




















































i is the same for every i in equilibrium, the bargaining game (when renegotiating
the gde
i s) is symmetric and the renegotiated gre
i s become e¢ cient (just as under short-term
agreements). Since the ￿rst best is implemented, UR and UG are unique and as before.
Proof of Proposition 13.
The fact that Proposition 13 describes one equilibrium is easy to check. Uniqueness is
not claimed for this case: while there cannot be ine¢ cient equilibria (since all countries
strictly prefer to negotiate an e¢ cient contract), multiple contracts can implement the
￿rst best. For example, any contract specifying every gi;t, t 2 f1;:::;Tg, implements the
36￿rst best as long as gi;1 is equal to g￿
i and the contract can be renegotiated already in the
second period. The level of gi;t, t > 1, is then not important. If gi;t 6= g￿
i and T > t > 1,
the gi;ts will be renegotiated (to g￿
i) before period t.
Proof of Proposition 14.
The proposition follows from those above, since technological spillovers are allowed in all
proofs.
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